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Introduction
In many significant ways politicians do not resemble the 
overall populations from which they are drawn. Thanks to 
existing research, we know, for example, that politicians 
are more likely to be male (Lawless and Fox, 2010; Norris 
and Lovenduski, 1995), white, wealthy, highly-educated 
and to have held certain professional occupations than the 
average member of society (Carnes, 2013). One explana-
tion for these patterns is that political elites are more likely 
to encourage the kinds of candidates they want to see run-
ning for office to do so (Broockman, 2014). This idea of 
recruitment, or mobilisation, has also been put forward as a 
possible remedy for these varying kinds of political unrep-
resentativeness, working on the evidence-based assump-
tion that an effective method of getting individuals from 
traditionally under-represented groups to run for political 
office at any level is simply to ask them to do so (Carroll 
and Sanbonmatsu, 2013; Lawless and Fox, 2010; Moncrief 
et al., 2001). David Broockman (2014: 109) writes, ‘having 
been asked to run [is] the modal explanation for candidacy 
or the factor most positively associated with interest in run-
ning’. Evidence on whether this effect holds in the case of 
progressive political ambition, where incumbent legislators 
consider whether to run for higher office, is mixed, with 
previous research highlighting the added importance of 
strategic and electoral concerns relating to the political 
opportunity structure facing a prospective candidate in line 
with classic rational choice approaches (Maestas et al., 
2006; Schlesinger, 1966).
However, existing work is less clear on the effect that 
the behaviour of aspirant candidates themselves has on pro-
gressive political ambition relative to being recruited; the 
possibility that the behaviour of aspirant candidates might 
itself be correlated with both being recruited in the first 
instance, and correlated with that appeal consequently 
being successful and resulting in the individual running for 
higher office. Although this can be explored through the 
use of experimental approaches (Broockman, 2014; Preece 
and Stoddard, 2015; Preece et al., 2016), data collected 
from incumbent legislators on their progressive ambition is 
often observational. Here, we use observational data to 
explore how recruitment appeals affect the political ambi-
tion of incumbent sub-national legislators, specifically ask-
ing whether recruitment effects hold having controlled for 
the behaviour of aspirant candidates themselves. Breaking 
down the process of running for higher office, we find that 
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signalling behaviour by the prospective candidate increases 
the likelihood of them entering the selection process for 
higher office, but does not affect the likelihood of them 
being successful in this endeavour. We conclude, like other 
recent research in this area, that targeted elite recruitment 
alone might not be enough to increase the diversity of the 
candidate pool for national political office (Preece et al., 
2016). Why does this identification of the importance of 
candidate signalling matter? Practically, it means that the 
efforts of political parties to reverse the under-representation 
of certain groups might be less effective than is currently 
thought: recruitment appeals might simply be tapping in to 
an already-existing well of political ambition that was gen-
erated independently of them. Theoretically, it follows that 
academic research on political ambition might also be look-
ing at the question of why some are more ambitious than 
others in the wrong way – instead of focusing solely on 
issues of structure and recruitment, a greater focus on 
underlying psychological dispositions and the role of dis-
criminatory politico-social networks might be called for.
Data and methods
We utilise original data collected via an online survey avail-
able between February and May 2014 from incumbent 
local legislators (termed local councillors in the UK) in 
London, United Kingdom.1 Data was collected ahead of the 
May 2014 London local elections at which all electoral 
wards would be contested. A personalised link to the survey 
was emailed to 1804 legislators from 32 different London 
councils at the email address on their official webpages. We 
received 420 responses and 395 were complete, a valid 
response rate of 22%.
London is a useful case to focus on when exploring pro-
gressive ambition. Local legislators in London differ from 
their colleagues in the rest of the UK: they are younger, 
more likely to be women, less likely to be white and less 
likely to be retired (and thus more likely to hold additional 
occupations) (Kettlewell and Phillips, 2014). Additionally, 
London is the political centre of the United Kingdom. 
Proximity to the UK Parliament at Westminster will afford 
local legislators greater proximity to national party organi-
sations based in the city as well as opportunities to work in 
national-level political-focused occupations. Our sample is 
representative of London legislators as a whole in terms of 
party, sex and ethnicity (Kettlewell and Phillips, 2014). 
Although, as with all case studies, our results may not gen-
eralise to sub-national legislators everywhere, we expect 
there to be a substantial number of individuals in our sam-
ple who are progressively ambitious in some way, increas-
ing our ability to explore the underlying phenomenon in 
question.
Our measure of political ambition comprises four cate-
gories that account for whether a legislator has expressed 
no interest in running for higher office, has considered 
running for office but has not acted on it, or has actually 
acted on their intention by either entering a candidate selec-
tion process or standing as a parliamentary candidate: 42% 
of respondents had not considered running for higher office, 
whilst 30% had expressed an intention to run and consid-
ered higher office and a further 28% had taken some action 
towards actually doing so.2
Our variable of interest seeks to distinguish individuals 
who were solely recruited by political actors from those 
who signalled their ambition by approaching a political 
actor regarding their running for higher office, and from 
those who both approached and were recruited. We com-
pare these categories against the reference category who 
were neither recruited nor signallers. We control for a range 
of demographic variables, including sex, age, ethnicity, 
marital and parental status and personality traits as meas-
ured on the Big Five scale (Dietrich et al., 2012; Lawless 
and Fox, 2010). We also control for the political socialisa-
tion of prospective candidates, including their family back-
grounds and early-life engagement with politics (Lawless, 
2012) as well as non-legislative political experience, for 
example as Congressional staffers or in other ‘instrumental’ 
political occupations (Hernsson, 1994).3 Full details of sur-
vey items, and more information on the sample, are avail-
able in the Appendix (see Supplementary material online).
Model results: progressive ambition 
among incumbent local legislators
How important to the expression of political ambition is 
being recruited by a political actor? Does the signalling of 
ambition by the prospective candidate through approaching 
political actors matter more? Or are those individuals who 
are both signallers and recruited more likely to express pro-
gressive ambition? To address these questions, we first use 
a binomial logistic regression model to contrast those who 
are actively seeking office against those who have not taken 
active steps to stand (see Table 2). Model 1 includes only 
the recruited and signaller categorical variable: those 
recruited only; signallers only; and both recruited and sig-
nalled are examined against the base category neither 
recruited nor signalled. Model 2 explores whether these 
effects hold after controlling for established predictors of 
political ambition and other social baseline indicators. 
Second, we use a multinomial logistic regression to exam-
ine progressive ambition in more depth, contrasting those 
incumbent local legislators who have either entered the 
selection process, have actually stood for parliamentary 
office or who have no intention of standing against those 
individuals who have considered standing but not acted on 
it (see Table 3). We follow the same format as in Table 2, 
with Model 1 focusing only on recruitment and approach-
ing political actors and Model 2 examining whether such 
effects hold once other covariates are included. All model 
fit statistics operate in the expected direction with 
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reductions in the log-likelihood and the Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC) evident from Model 1 to Model 2.
Before the models, Table 1 provides a descriptive com-
parison of respondents falling across the four categories of 
progressive ambition. Confirming existing findings, there 
is a negative relationship between being female and pro-
gressive ambition. Of those who entered a selection pro-
cess, fewer than 35% were women, declining to just over 
25% of those who stood for election. More than 20% of 
non-white legislators had entered the selection process, but 
of those who stood for election, fewer than 8% were non-
white compared to 12% in the overall sample. There is 
some evidence to suggest that individuals who had been 
employed in instrumental occupations were more likely to 
have entered the selection process or stood as a parliamen-
tary candidate. Similarly, there is also evidence that indi-
viduals who exhibit emotional stability, and whose parents 
were heavily politically involved, are more likely to have 
stood in an election.
More than 60% of those who had not considered stand-
ing were neither recruited nor signallers, and just under a 
third were solely recruited by political actors. More than 
20% of those who had entered the selection process were 
individuals who signalled their ambition by approaching a 
relevant political actor while more than 60% had both 
approached and been recruited. A similar number of those 
who actually stood as a candidate had both signalled to, and 
been recruited by, a political actor.4
Based on existing findings in this area, we might expect 
sex to have a notable influence on levels of progressive 
ambition, and on the interplay of elite recruitment and deci-
sion-making. Of those who had been recruited by political 
actors, just under half were women. Fewer than 40% of 
individuals who had both signalled and been recruited were 
women, compared to just over 25% of those who signalled 
their ambition by approaching a relevant political actor. 
Around a fifth of the 40% of women who had both sig-
nalled and been recruited had stood as a parliamentary can-
didate. Our data suggests that more women were recruited 
by political actors than men, and that a slightly higher per-
centage of men signalled their ambition by approaching a 
political actor than women. Whilst this is not entirely con-
clusive, there seems to be some circumstantial evidence 
that women are recruited more than men, perhaps reflecting 
recent party efforts to increase women’s representation in 
political institutions. However, this does not seem equally 
true of ethnicity. Notwithstanding the caveat of relatively 
low numbers, just over 22% of those who signalled their 
ambition were non-white compared to 11.2% who were 
recruited. A similar number were both recruited and had 
signalled their ambition. Comparing non-whites and whites, 
only 9% of whites signalled their ambition compared to 
around 19% of non-whites, while slightly more whites 
were recruited by political actors than non-whites. Relative 
to their overall presence in the sample, it seems reasonably 
clear that more minority ethnic than majority ethnic local 
legislators are signallers, something that should be explored 
in future research.
The findings in Model 1, Table 2 suggest that those who 
signalled their ambition and those who were both recruited 
and signallers were significantly more likely to actively 
seek to stand for public office when compared against the 
base category not approached nor recruited. Signallers were 
9.7 times more likely to actively seek to stand whereas those 
who were both signallers and recruited were nearly 13 times 
more likely. Yet there was no similar effect for those who 
were just recruited by political actors alone. Such individu-
als were not significantly more likely to actively seek to 
stand than those who were neither signallers nor recruited. 
Do these results hold when other established indicators of 
political ambition are taken in account? We present the full 
results in Model 2. Holding all variables constant, signallers 
were 10 times more likely to actively seek to stand. However, 
individuals who were both recruited and also signallers 
increased their odds of actively seeking to run by a magni-
tude of 13.6. To ease interpretation, we estimate the discrete 
change on the probability for each of the values averaged 
across the observed values.5 These average marginal effects 
(AMEs) are graphically illustrated in Figure 1. We calculate 
the baseline probability of actively seeking office if all inde-
pendent variables are set on their empirical mean. The pre-
dicted probability equals 1.9 percentage points. This helps 
us to evaluate the impact of each of the indicators because 
we can compare the respective effect to the baseline proba-
bility. On average, the probability of signallers actively 
seeking to stand is 30% higher than the reference category 
which is being neither a signaller nor recruited by political 
actors. Being both a signaller and being recruited had a 
slightly larger effect. On average, such individuals were 
34% more likely to stand. Recruitment was therefore influ-
ential only where an individual had also signalled their 
interest in running for higher office to political actors. 
Recruitment alone did not have a significant influence on 
individuals actively seeking to stand (compared to those 
who were neither signallers nor recruited). Of the remaining 
predictors, well-established drivers of progressive ambition 
were significant. There is also evidence of a sex effect, with 
the odds of women actively seeking higher office being 2.8 
times smaller than those of men, a statistically significant 
difference. On average, the probability of women actively 
standing for public office is fourteen percentage points 
lower than it is for men. Finally, those aged under 40 are on 
average sixteen percentage points less likely to stand than 
those aged between 40 and 59.
When does signalling or being recruited actually matter? 
Are they key drivers of whether an individual actually acts 
on their consideration to stand for public office by entering 
the selection process? And when compared against those 
who have not taken active steps, are they the major drivers 
among those legislators who have actually stood for 
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parliamentary office? We address these questions using a 
multinomial logistical regression where considering to 
stand is the reference category. As before, we use the same 
format and predictor variables with the key findings 
Table 1. Socio-economic, socialisation, barriers to running, personality traits, etc. characteristics of progressive ambition 
(percentages).
Variables Not considered 
standing
Considered 
standing
Entered selection 
process
Stood for 
election
Overall 
sample
Socio-economic  
Female 51.2 35.6 34.5 25.5 40.8
Married 56.5 55.1 60.3 64.7 57.7
Age under 40 7.7 28.8 13.8 15.7 15.9
Age 40–59 28.0 38.1 55.2 51.0 38.0
Age 60 plus 56.0 28.8 27.6 27.5 40.0
Missing age 8.3 4.2 3.4 5.9 6.1
Non-white 11.3 11.0 20.7 7.8 12.2
Degree 62.5 77.1 89.7 88.2 74.2
Live alone 40.5 36.4 27.6 29.4 35.9
Cllr responsible
for household tasks
11.9 14.4 19.0 17.6 14.4
Spouse responsible for household tasks 21.4 22.0 39.7 21.6 24.3
Even responsibility
for household tasks
26.2 27.1 13.8 31.4 25.3
Children dependent age 11.3 21.2 27.6 29.4 19.0
Socialisation  
Talked politics 63.7 69.5 75.9 68.6 67.8
Grew up in London 44.0 50.0 41.4 35.3 44.3
Parent & family
involved in politics
 
Party member only 23.8 16.9 29.3 19.6 22.0
Elected office only 7.7 6.8 5.2 5.9 6.8
Both member & elected 7.7 14.4 10.3 17.6 11.4
Barriers running for
office (not bothered)
 
Spending less time
with family/friends
53.6 35.6 46.6 52.9 47.1
Privacy/media intrusion 48.8 39.8 51.7 52.9 47.1
Personal interests 57.1 47.5 55.2 68.6 55.4
Negative impact on
occupational goals
63.1 66.9 70.7 72.5 66.6
Occupational experience  
Instrumental occupation 11.9 18.6 25.9 27.5 18.0
Signalled/recruited by
political actors
 
Not approached/recruited 60.7 22.9 5.2 17.6 35.7
Recruited by political
actors only
32.7 20.3 10.3 7.8 22.5
Signalled to political
actors only
3.6 12.7 20.7 13.7 10.1
Both signalled & recruited 3.0 44.1 63.8 60.8 31.6
Personality traits (SA)  
Open-minded 29.2 34.7 43.1 37.3 33.9
Conscientious 19.6 13.6 27.6 11.8 18.0
Extraverted 16.7 19.5 27.6 21.6 19.7
Agreeable 23.2 23.7 31.0 19.6 24.1
Emotionally stable 30.4 2.9 31.0 37.3 29.1
N 168 118 58 51 395
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presented in Table 3 (full model results are in Appendix 
Table A1). Once again, an aspirant candidate signalling 
their interest in running appears to have a greater effect 
than being recruited (see Model 1). But crucially, the 
Table 2. Logistic model of progressive ambition of sitting councillors: actively seeking to stand versus not standing.
Variables Model 1 Model 2
β SE β SE
Constant −2.37* 0.40 −4.60* 1.29
Signalled/recruited by political actors: base = neither  
Recruited by political actors only 0.31 0.45 0.22 0.47
Signalled to political actors only 2.27* 0.44 2.30* 0.52
Both signalled & recruited 2.55* 0.35 2.61* 0.41
Socio-economic variables  
Female – −1.03* 0.37
Degree – 1.39* 0.42
Non-White – 0.48 0.48
Age: base = age 40–59  
Age under 40 – −1.19* 0.42
Age 60 plus – −0.19 0.36
Missing age – 0.26 0.78
Family structures/roles  
Married – −0.10 0.47
Dependent children – 0.17 0.29
Responsibility for household tasks: base = councillor  
Spouse responsible for a majority – 0.80 0.52
Evenly responsible for a majority – −0.02 0.43
Live alone – −0.04 0.54
Personality traits  
Open-minded – −0.04 0.22
Conscientious – 0.14 0.14
Extraverted – −0.10 0.14
Agreeable – −0.20 0.21
Emotionally stable – 0.43* 0.19
Political socialisation  
Talk politics at home – 0.24 0.34
Parent/family involved in politics: base = not involved  
Parent/family party member only 0.05 0.36
Parent/family elected office only – −0.04 0.70
Parent/family both member & elected – 0.09 0.51
Socialisation by place  
Grew up in London – −0.04 0.31
Barriers to running for office: base = negative perception  
Spending less time with family/friends – −0.02 0.35
Loss of privacy/media intrusion – 0.29 0.34
Less personal interests – 0.03 0.37
Negative impact on occupational goals – 0.24 0.39
Occupational experience  
Instrumental occupation – 0.98* 0.41
Model fit  
Wald Chi-square 74.49* 103.60*
Log likelihood –186.15 –162.66
McFadden’s R2 0.20 0.30
AIC 380.30 385.31
N 395 395
*Significant ⩽ 0.05.
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signalling effect is only present for entering the selection 
process, not for actually standing for higher office. Similar 
effects are found for those who have both signalled to, and 
been recruited by, political actors. These results are robust 
to the addition of further predictor variables. Compared to 
those who have not acted but are considering standing, leg-
islators are 6.8 times more likely to enter a selection pro-
cess if they have signalled their interest in running to a 
political actor and around 8 times more likely if they have 
both signalled and been recruited. Those that have solely 
been recruited are no more likely to have either entered a 
selection process or actually stood for higher office than 
those who have experienced neither.
We again examine the average marginal effects to fully 
assess the impact of these variables (see Figure 2 and Table 
A2 in the Appendix).6 On average, the probability that leg-
islators who had signalled their interest to political actors 
had entered the selection process to stand for higher office 
increases by 21 percentage points. The probability that 
those who had both signalled and been recruited entering 
the selection process increases by 25 percentage points.
Of the remaining predictors, legislators with a degree 
were 3.2 times more likely to enter the selection process 
(compared to the base category). The most important driver 
among those who actually had stood for higher public 
office, holding all other variables constant, was being a 
man. The probability of having stood for higher office is on 
average 11 percentage points lower for women than men. 
Other variables, including early-life political exposure and 
socialisation, are insignificant. This suggests that although 
they may not explain progressive ambition, they might 
have a more pronounced effect on the decision to seek pub-
lic office in the first instance.
Discussion and conclusion
This paper explores the effect of aspirant candidate behav-
iour on progressive political ambition. We find that signal-
ling their ambition by approaching a political actor to 
discuss running for higher office has a significant effect the 
likelihood that an aspirant candidate will act on considera-
tions to stand for higher office. Recruitment by a political 
actor only has a significant effect in combination with such 
signalling. In conjunction with signalling, being recruited 
certainly matters, but the signalling of ambition to a politi-
cal actor by the aspirant candidate is the key driver, some-
thing that needs to be explored better in future research in 
order to identify in detail who the people more likely to 
Table 3. Multinomial logistic model of progressive ambition (base = considered standing but not acted on it).
Entered selection Stood for Parliament No intention  of standing
β SE β SE β SE
Variables (Model 1 without controls)
Constant –2.20 0.61 –1.10* 0.38 1.33* 0.22
Signalled/recruited by political actors: base = neither 
Recruited by political actors only 0.81 0.76 –0.69 0.66 –0.50 0.33
Signalled to political actors only 1.97* 0.72 0.34 0.60 –2.25* 0.53
Both signalled & recruited 1.86* 0.65 0.58 0.45 –3.67* 0.52
Model fit  
Wald Chi-square 197.33* 197.33* 197.33*
Log likelihood –403.20 –403.20 –403.20
McFadden’s R2 0.20 0.20 0.20
AIC 830.40 830.40 830.40
N 395 395 395
Variables (Model 2 with controls)
Constant −3.80* 1.80 −3.79* 1.81 1.91 1.57
Signalled/recruited by political actors: base = neither  
Recruited by political actors only 0.80 0.80 −0.71 0.70 −0.44 0.36
Signalled to political actors only 1.92* 0.79 0.48 0.68 −2.61* 0.60
Both signalled & recruited 2.09* 0.71 0.70 0.53 −3.80* 0.57
Model fit  
Wald Chi-square 313.78* 313.78* 313.78*
Log likelihood –344.97 –344.97 –344.97
McFadden’s R2 0.31 0.31 0.31
AIC 869.95 869.95 869.95
N 395 395 395
*Significant ⩽ 0.05.
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undertake signalling behaviour are, why this is the case and 
what the mechanism in play here actually is. For example, 
building on Broockman’s notion of selective recruitment, 
self-instigated approaches might be a reaction to not being 
recruited, a pro-active attempt by an aspirant candidate to 
put themselves on the radar of potential recruiters. In such 
a case, signalling interest to a political actor might act as 
social proof of dedication or could be seen as indicative of 
the possession of inherent traits that might be considered 
relevant to a successful candidacy. For those individuals 
who feel they are not ingratiated into the relevant social 
networks, something perhaps correlated with membership 
of traditionally under-represented social groups, signal-
ling might be especially important. Alternatively, it might 
Figure 1. Average marginal effects with 95% confidence intervals of key variables on actively seeking to stand for office.
Figure 2. Average marginal effects of key variables on progressive ambition.
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simply be that certain patterns of socialisation and/or per-
sonality traits are present in individuals who approach 
political actors. These are just some of the aspects of aspir-
ant candidate behaviour that could be examined in future 
research. Such research would have important real-world 
implications: it is generally accepted that an effective way 
for political parties to increase the number of candidates 
from traditionally under-represented groups is to go out and 
recruit them. Our findings here show that this might not be 
as simple a relationship as first thought.
Our study has limitations. It is possible that those aspir-
ant candidates who undertook signalling behaviour did so 
because they fully expect to get a positive response. 
Conversely, it might be that those who were instead 
recruited were particular types of local legislators who 
were seen to require a lot of persuasion as it was perceived 
that would not be interested in running without it. As such, 
recruitment by political actors might have been used here 
to persuade them and thus didn’t have much success given 
their underlying negativity to stand. The data we analyse 
in this paper does not permit us to explore these ideas, but 
future research should consider them. Additionally, it 
might be the case that recruitment functions in a different 
way for progressive ambition than any initial run for 
office, something that we cannot test here. Finally, owing 
to our case study approach, it is possible that our findings 
may be particular to the case of London or the UK, which 
has a stronger party system than the United States, the 
focus of much existing research in this area. Interrogating 
the role of aspirant candidate behaviour in different politi-
cal contexts would greatly develop understanding on this 
point. Notwithstanding these limitations, our findings 
should encourage scholars and practitioners alike to ques-
tion how the process of candidate mobilisation appears to 
function.
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Notes
1. It is well-established that sub-national legislative offices 
provide a pool of eligible candidates to run for higher 
office (Allen, 2013; Lawless and Fox, 2010; Moncrief 
et al., 2001). In the United Kingdom, research has 
found that around a third of all Members of Parliament 
(MPs) elected since 1945 have had experience in a local 
legislature prior to their election to the House of Commons 
(Local Government Association, 2008).
2. Full details of the dependent variable are in the Appendix. 
This distinction is based on the response category ‘Have 
entered a selection process or otherwise made efforts to 
run for parliamentary candidacy’. We might expect this to 
encompass putting one’s name forward for a selection pro-
cess, entering such a process, contesting such a process if 
shortlisted and so on. Critically, undertaking such activities 
shows not only intent but also a related action towards the 
goal of holding higher office.
3. Of course, based on classic contributions to this research 
area, we might also expect aspirant candidates to adjust 
their activities in accordance with the political opportunity 
structure in front of them, namely whether they resided 
in or close to a district with an open seat or not (Maestas 
et al., 2006). Although this might seem pertinent, we do 
not account for this in our analysis for various reasons. 
Primarily, the UK has a tradition of candidates travelling 
to contest constituencies that may be far from their current 
place of residence or where they sit on a local council. In 
addition, it is common for candidates to ‘blood’ themselves 
in seats considered unwinnable for their party as a dem-
onstration of partisan loyalty. As such, it is not clear how 
we would tie individual legislators to given open or closed 
districts, especially given the intimate proximity of the 73 
constituencies in the Greater London area.
4. For brevity, the percentages of the progressive ambition cat-
egories within each category of signalling and recruiting are 
as follows. For those recruited only, 61.8% did not consider 
standing, 27% considered standing, 6.7% entered the selec-
tion process and 4.5% stood for parliamentary election. Of 
those who signalled their ambition, 15% did not consider 
standing, 37.5% considered standing, 30% entered the selec-
tion process and 17.5% stood for parliament. For those who 
were both signalled and recruited, the figures were 4% not 
considered standing, 41.6% considered standing, 29.6% 
entered the selection process and 24.8% stood as a parlia-
mentary candidate.
5. A marginal effect measures the effect on the conditional 
mean of y of a change in one of the regressors. In a linear 
model, the marginal effect equals the slope coefficient but in 
nonlinear models, this is not the case. This has led to a num-
ber of methods for calculating marginal effects. Here we use 
average marginal effects (AMEs). To get the AME, the mar-
ginal effect is first calculated for each individual with their 
observed levels of covariates. These values are then averaged 
across all individuals.
6. The baseline probabilities when all independent variables 
are set at their empirical mean are as follows: not consid-
ered standing 36 percentage points; considered standing 
44 percentage points; entered selection process 10 per-
centage points; and stood for Parliamentary election 11 
percentage points.
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